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Abstract: The study adopts a critical discourse analysis approach to 
Chiang Kai-shek’s (CKS) internal nationalist propaganda and authori-
tarian discourse practices, investigating his New Year and National 
Day speeches in the 1950s. Authoritarian characteristics are evident in 
strategies such as legitimation, reification, or myth-making, in the 
antagonist categorisation of Self versus Other, in Self-glorification 
and the idolisation of the dead, in the hegemonic creation of com-
monality and unity, and in the metaphorical conceptualisation of 
reality. Patterns of idolising the dead serve to impose and legitimise 
CKS’s worldview among his citizens. Another pattern is CKS’s inven-
tion of imaginary compatriots within the “enslaved China” waiting 
for the best time to overthrow the “bandits’” rule. Reference to these 
imaginary agents indirectly presents to his audience a false but better 
impression of the Self, and a dimmer view of the communist bandits. 
A third pattern is CKS’s metaphorical use of language, such as refer-
ences to communist China as a puppet regime of Russia.  
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,QWURGXFWLRQ
The ways in which political leaders appropriate verbal means for 
ideological purposes have been extensively studied in the field of 
critical discourse analysis (CDA) (Chilton 2004; van Dijk 1995). Here-
in it has been argued that leadership discourse is a type of social prac-
tice, where power relations in society are legitimised and reinforced 
by various discourse strategies. In the field, few studies are based on a 
representative body of authentic data when it comes to analysing 
Chinese leadership discourse. While speeches of contemporary lead-
ers in China or Taiwan have been investigated (Holt and Chang 2009; 
Lams 2018a, 2018b; Lams and Liao 2011; Lu and Ahrens 2008), re-
markably few studies have been conducted on the discourse features 
of the prime actor on the Taiwanese political scene during early 
Kuomintang (Guomindang, KMT) rule on the island: General Chiang 
Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi; hereafter, CKS). Therefore, this article intends 
to fill this gap by presenting an analysis of CKS’s leadership dis-
course, hoping to contribute to a deeper understanding of how a 
political elite uses language to mobilise the state and consolidate lead-
ership in a Chinese context. 
The many facets of the authoritarian rule of the KMT regime 
under CKS’s leadership have been discussed from numerous perspec-
tives (see other contributions in this topical issue), with the exception 
of the role of language in maintaining or subverting power relations – 
as extensively researched in CDA. Not unlike the Chinese leaders 
who, from ancient times to the contemporary era, knew how to use 
language to instil their authoritarian worldview in the minds of their 
citizens (Cao 2014; Ji 2004; Lams 2014; Link 1992; Marinelli 2014; 
Schoenhals 1992; Zhang 2011), CKS, the Chinese KMT leader, ex-
hibited a similar meta-pragmatic awareness of powerful discursive 
tactics in his widespread use of propaganda and indoctrination. 
Hence, this article aims to explore the characteristics of the authori-
tarian discursive style in CKS’s public speeches. While the diachronic 
study by Lu and Ahrens (2008) details how the ideological orientation 
of Republic of China (ROC) presidents shapes the use of metaphors 
in their public speeches, this analysis did not concern authoritarian 
discourse itself – and CKS only featured as one of the political actors. 
However, the language use and style of CKS is worthy of investiga-
tion in itself, given the leading role he played in republican China as 
the head of the KMT.  
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CKS fought alongside the communists against the Japanese army, 
and, a few years later, engaged in the civil war between the Com-
munist and Nationalist Parties. After having lost the mainland to the 
Communist Party, he withdrew his army and transferred the govern-
ment of the ROC to Taiwan, and ruled as the president and supreme 
leader of the ROC until his death in 1975. Re-imposition of Chinese 
authority on the island of Taiwan after the Japanese withdrawal in 
1945 did not go smoothly. The seeds of local Taiwanese discontent 
with the KMT leadership had been planted by the notoriously strict 
administrative style of Chen Yi, the KMT-appointed governor of 
Taiwan from 1945 onwards. The early enthusiasm of the Taiwanese, 
who had welcomed the Chinese liberation of the island from Japan-
ese rule (1895–1945), quickly turned to bitterness when feelings of 
mutual distrust arose because of the KMT army officials’ fear of Japan-
ese or communist collaborators in Taiwan. Also, during the civil war 
on the mainland, the Nationalists had reportedly looted Taiwan, 
“stripping its people of as much as $1 billion in property” (Tucker 
1994: 27). The relative prosperity of the island had been replaced by 
unemployment, inflation, and a sharp drop in production. As Tucker 
writes,  
The breakdown of local services such as sanitation, while officials 
concentrated on collecting booty instead of garbage, led to the 
emergence of plague, smallpox, and malaria […]. Taiwan appeared 
to have passed from subjugation at the hands of an imperial gov-
ernment in Tokyo to a far more irresponsible and costly subjuga-
tion at the hands of an inept government in Nanking. (Tucker 
1994: 28)  
The disillusionment engendered by KMT policies eventually resulted 
in an ethnic and political clash between the native Taiwanese and the 
newcomers, triggered by the 28 February 1947 Incident, which has 
been widely documented in the literature. For a first-hand insight into 
the political circumstances of early Nationalist rule after 1945, see 
Kerr (1966) and Peng (1972). These events sowed the seeds for the 
sustained tense relationship between the KMT regime and the local 
Taiwanese population, exacerbated by CKS’s mobilisation of young 
Taiwanese men for a war on what to them seemed “foreign” territory 
(see, for example, Chen 2012; Lee 2014; Wu 1987).  
Not surprisingly, upon CKS’s military withdrawal from the main-
land to continue ROC rule in Taiwan, the KMT leader faced a popu-
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lation that was reluctant to assist him in his ambition to regain con-
trol over mainland China. Having to counter local dissent and oppo-
sition, he instituted martial law, arguing that the “free China” – as he 
called Taiwan – had to be protected from communist insurgency. 
That Taiwan could hardly be called a free China and actually under-
went a “white terror” period has been poignantly described in the 
biographical novel A Taste of Freedom by the international law scholar 
and future presidential candidate Peng Ming-min (1972). Many stud-
ies have been conducted on the coercive institutions and state vio-
lence under KMT authoritarianism (see, among others, Chen 2016; 
Greitens 2013; Tsang 1993). CKS’s ambition to reconquer the main-
land created an institutionally enforced discursive manipulation of 
people’s minds to turn against Maoist China. In close connection to 
Cheng’s article in this issue dealing with this topic, the present study1 
looks into the exact nuts and bolts of the discursive strategies used in 
CKS’s linguistic ideological engineering. This is a study of the verbal 
strategies through which CKS further consolidated his leadership, 
aiming to better understand the importance of language and ideology 
in the realm of political leadership and propaganda in general. Fur-
ther, we strive to take examples from the ROC up into the global 
research on leadership discourse.   
7KHRUHWLFDO)UDPHZRUN
The wider framework draws on the theoretical insights of CDA (Chil-
ton 2004; Fairclough 1989, 1992; Van Dijk 1995), viewing language 
use in social contexts as a social practice. CDA assumes that social 
power relations are established and reinforced in discourse, with that 
of political leaders being an oft-researched topic. Since CDA reveals 
the ideological assumptions embodied in leadership discourse, the 
concept of ideology plays a crucial role in the analysis – and is to be 
understood as taken-for-granted or unquestioned significations or 
constructions of reality that contribute “to the production, reproduc-

1 The completion of this article was partially supported by the research grant 
“The Language of Death in Taiwan: Evidence from Condolatory Idioms, Pre-
sidential Eulogies and the Self-introductions of Undertakers” (RG002-N-15), 
awarded by the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Ex-
change. We thank guest editor Isabelle Cheng and the reviewers for their valu-
able comments. Corresponding author: <lut.lams@kuleuven.be>. 
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tion or transformation of relations of domination” (Fairclough 1992: 
87). Based on Gramsci’s (1971) notion of “hegemony,” CDA theo-
rists hold that underlying ideological discourse is a quest for maintain-
ing power and domination, serving the interests of certain groups 
(e.g. political leaders). However these specific interests are disguised, 
with persuasive discourse leading people into believing or accepting 
that dominance is legitimate and in the interests of everyone.  
Therefore, a subtle discursive process of consensus-building by 
state institutions (such as the educational and legal systems, the po-
lice, and the military), political alliances, and the media shapes power 
as jointly produced for the common good. Hegemony is reached 
when the discourse is presented as natural, and when other voices are 
sidelined. Naturalisation is a universal trait of any political actor or 
group intent on maintaining leadership, but is especially salient in the 
official discourse of authoritarian leaders (Lams, Crauwels, and 
Serban 2014). In authoritarian regimes – where the state installs Party 
departments across all sectors of society, thereby eliminating state–
society distinctions – repressiveness takes over society as a totalising 
goal in itself. Therefore, one can find the traits of totalitarian dis-
courses in authoritarian regimes. As Lams, Crauwels, and Serban argue,  
We can talk of totalitarian discourses in authoritarian regimes, espe-
cially in establishing a cult of the centralized/authoritative power, or 
of the military, as a type of the cult of personality that reshapes 
both national history and society entirely according to an authori-
tative vision. Political power is concentrated in a military or single 
party personality and the totalizing discourse gathers the society 
under the banners of this ongoing cult of personality. In countries 
with authoritarian regimes the official discourse – that is, the dis-
course of individuals and institutions representing the state – is to-
talitarian by metonymy […]. The military or a single party takes 
over the entire society, explaining its past, present and future ex-
istence. (Lams, Crauwels, and Serban 2014: 4)   
Admittedly, in authoritarian regimes such as the one under CKS’s 
leadership the denial of individualism is less present than it is in to-
talitarian systems. This is because they still allow “for the activities of 
religious bodies and civil associations as long as the people involved 
are not critical of the leadership and the military” (Lams, Crauwels, 
and Serban 2014: 5). The personality cult of the leader, “enhanced by 
the metaphor of the father figure” (Lams 2014: 191), typifies totalitar-
ian leadership discourse – as evident, for example, in the representa-
  Critical Discourse Analysis of CKS’s Early Wartime Rhetoric 93 

tion of Hitler as the father or the secularised messiah in Nazi Ger-
many discourse (Sepp 2014), honorific references to father Generalis-
simio Kim Il-Sung in North Korean history textbooks (Fraysse-Kim 
2014), and in the former dictatorial discourse of the Marcos family in 
the Philippines (Tigno and Franco 2014).  
In addition to referring to the Self as the caring parent, the dicta-
tor or autocrat will typically adopt a nationalist discourse that rem-
inisces about a mythical past, filled with nostalgic references to the 
founding father(s) of the nation. This referential strategy is not 
unique to authoritarian leaders, however. It can also be found in the 
discourse of nationalist leaders in more democratic societies. In this 
political environment, the stories of the founding fathers serve to 
construct a common national identity (e.g. the United States’ found-
ing fathers) and could also be used for political expediency to rally 
citizens around the flag in times of external threat. In the case of 
dictators and autocrats, however, reference to the founding fathers 
usually serves to legitimise continued one-party rule, and constitutes 
an emotional ploy to incite citizens into following these fathers as 
role models – heroes willing to surrender their lives for the good of 
the nation (see the notion of “necropolitics,” as explained by Cheng 
in this topical issue).   
To analyse the ways in which hegemony or consensus is 
achieved in Chinese leadership discourse at the highest political level, 
the current article examines the national leader’s public speeches to 
identify the use of discursive strategies that reveal ideological meaning 
construction, as first proposed by Thompson (1990). These consist 
of: (1) legitimation; (2) myth-making or reification of contentious 
issues into non-negotiable truths – the process of reification portrays 
processes as natural or permanent events, thus obliterating their his-
torical, social, or political character; (3) essentialist and antagonist 
categorisations of in- and out-groups, by the glorification of the Self 
and expurgation of the Other; (4) unification and instilling a national 
sense of commonality and cohesion; and, (5) dissimulation, by divert-
ing attention from existing relations through powerful metaphorical 
conceptualisation, steering people’s opinions in one direction while 
eliminating alternative meanings. While these strategies are not lim-
ited to authoritarian discourses and are also employed in any national-
ist discourse to varying degrees, they cumulatively typify the ideologi-
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cal operation of authoritarian discourses – as illustrated by Lams 
(2014) regarding the Chinese communist leadership discourse.  
Signs of totalitarian discourse also become apparent in the mobil-
ising and inciteful tone of a “wooden tongue,” imbued with pathos, 
and in nationalist exhortative speech acts. The present study browses 
through a selection of CKS’s speeches in search of this type of “lin-
guistic engineering” (Ji 2004), which aims to steer popular opinion – 
and, as a consequence, action. In addition to examining these discur-
sive traits of authoritarian and nationalist leadership discourse, the 
current article also looks into the conceptualisation power of tropes 
therein, such as metaphors. Hence, its analytical framework is equally 
informed by critical metaphor analysis (CMA) (Charteris-Black 2004, 
2005). This goes a step further than CDA by incorporating the “con-
temporary theory of metaphor” (Kövecses 2002; Lakoff and Johnson 
1980; Yu 1998) into the analysis, and concentrates on how the use of 
metaphor reflects the ideological preferences of the speaker in the 
political domain. It has been argued that metaphor plays a central role 
in persuasion in public discourse (e.g. Pelclova and Lu 2018), serving 
to highlight certain aspects of reality and to hide others. As such, the 
speaker may get to manipulate the worldview that they intend to pre-
sent via verbal means and the hearer will pick up the communicated 
worldview in subtle ways. 
Metaphor in leadership discourse has been extensively studied, 
and has been pinpointed as a powerful implicit mechanism for politi-
cal leaders to introduce their worldviews and naturalise and sanction 
the ideological content that underlies their rhetoric (Charteris-Black 
2005). When it comes to Taiwanese/Chinese politics, it has been 
pointed out (Lu and Ahrens 2008) that KMT leaders’ use of meta-
phor, from CKS to Lee Teng-hui (Li Denghui), has a strong focus on 
the concept of “building” (i.e. comparing a country to a building) and 
that their usage of building metaphors is very different from the way 
in which they were applied in the discourse of Chen Shui-bian (Chen 
Shuibian), leader of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP; the par-
ty was established in 1986 as a political and ideological reaction 
against KMT rule), in the early years of the new century. In the KMT 
leaders’ speeches, the building metaphor occurred much more fre-
quently than in those of their DPP counterpart and was used in a 
retrospective way, in referring to the establishment of the country in 
1911 and its glorious past – which are figuratively compared to the 
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foundation of a building. By inference, the father of the nation, Sun 
Yat-sen (Sun Yixian), and the martyrs are likened to construction 
workers who contribute to laying the groundwork of the country-as-
building. They are therefore presented as deserving people’s respect, 
due to their hard work and achievements.  
(PSLULFDO$QDO\VLV6WUDWHJLHVRI6\PEROLF
0HDQLQJ*HQHUDWLRQDQG5KHWRULFDO3DWWHUQVLQ
&.6¶V3XEOLF6SHHFKHV
As concerns corpus selection, the language samples investigated are 
representative and authoritative, containing public speeches delivered 
on New Year’s Day and Double Tenth Day (National Day) by CKS 
during his presidential term from 1955 to early 1960 (marking the end 
of his second such term). Only those in CKS’s second term are in-
cluded for the sake of representativeness, to ensure that the language 
analysed is that produced by a leader who had by then consolidated 
total power over the Taiwanese population in a region which, as not-
ed, he called free China – as opposed to “red China,” which was not 
free. The period is limited to the early 1960s to remain consistent 
with the overall focus of this journal issue, which lies on the forma-
tive years – or the “making of authoritarianism.”   
The scope of the study is limited to public speeches to control 
for the same target audience, which is CKS’s fellow citizens (rather 
than certain smaller social groups). Only speeches delivered on New 
Year’s Day and Double Tenth Day are included, due to the political 
significance of these occasions (more on this below). The sample 
speeches were taken from the official website of the CKS Memorial 
Foundation, to ensure the authoritativeness of the data analysed. 
A methodological point to note is that although CKS delivered 
many speeches that could have been included in the scope of the 
present study, we focus only on those given on New Year’s Day and 
Double Tenth Day, for two reasons. First, these are important days 
on which the national leader speaks to the nation as a whole rather 
than addressing a specific audience, like the military, youth, overseas 
Chinese, or the Catholic community. Second, nowadays in Taiwan, 
most public holidays that used to be of political significance – such as 
Taiwan Retrocession Day (25 October), Sun Yat-sen’s birthday (12 
November), Constitution Day (25 December), among others – are no 
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longer celebrated as national holidays. The fact that New Year’s Day 
and Double Tenth Day are still observed as such indicates the politi-
cal significance of these dates. Their importance is also evidenced by 
the fact that only addresses given on these days are published in the 
English version on the website of the Office of the President. 
The findings of the empirical analysis show clear patterns in the 
use of ideologically motivated discursive strategies, each of which are 
illustrated in the next section with examples from the data. The 
speech excerpts are presented with the relevant linguistic features 
underlined, and the dates of the speeches are given at the end of each 
excerpt. All translations were done by the authors themselves. 
Besides these ideological strategies, other rhetorical manoeuvring 
was found to contribute to the authoritative nature of the speeches. 
These comprise utilising the force of exhortative speech acts to mo-
bilise the people, emotional appeals clad in moral argumentation, 
megalomaniac expressions of grandeur, and the strategic use of con-
ditional phrases in tandem with parallelism and repetition – creating a 
sense of urgency, and legitimising the course of action requested of 
citizens. These patterns of leadership discourse are exemplified in the 
section on “rhetorical patterns.”  
6WUDWHJLHVRI6\PEROLF0HDQLQJ*HQHUDWLRQ
The following paragraphs outline the most salient patterns in the use 
of discursive strategies. Among these are legitimation, myth-making, 
the categorisation of groups, unification, and dissimulation. They 
cumulatively make up the strength of CKS’s arguments intended to 
mobilise the people of Taiwan into military action against the com-
munist Other. 
Legitimation Strategies  
The strategy of “legitimation” constructs the demands for human 
sacrifice in a total war against the communists as the “mission” of a 
modern nation. CKS repeatedly refers to the ROC’s “historical role,” 
depicts the nation as the “pioneer of Asian democracy,” and uses 
phrases indicating the necessity of the anti-communist fight in terms 
of “responsibility for the future of the nation’s history, for the fate of 
humankind.” Legitimation is thus also realised in the climactic discur-
sive move from the local to the universal.  
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As can be seen in example (1), CKS emphasises the historical 
and critical role of “us” being posted at the front line (ࡽଘ, qianshao), 
which is a military metaphor, and holding the world’s security “in our 
hands,” thus framing his people’s position as being at the turning 
point of Asian history. The same idea is reiterated in the National 
Day speech of 1960, which legitimises military action to “fight for 
independence and freedom for all ethnic groups in Asia, and to elim-
inate catastrophe from the entire world.” This strategy constitutes a 
securitisation narrative. Example (2) presents the establishment of the 
country as a landmark in the 3,000-year span of Chinese history, de-
picting it as the first democratic country in Asia. Example (3) points 
out the historicity of the democratic mission, and the responsibility of 
everyone to contribute to this noble goal. 
(1) ᡁفㄉ൘䙉ཚᒣ⌻Ⲵࡽଘˈᦼᨑ㪇ӎ⍢ᆹডⲴ⁎㍀ˈа㠹а
अˈ䜭ᖡ丯഻䳋Ⲵ㿰㚭˗⛪ᡀ⛪ᮇˈᴤ䰌ײц⭼ⲴᆹডǄᡁفⲴ
ԫउᱟ⢩ࡕ㢡䡵ˈᡁفⲴࡽ䙄ᱟ❑䲀ݹ᰾ǄWe stand at the front 
line facing the Pacific Ocean with the very security of Asia in our 
hands. Whatever we do, the world is looking at us. The world’s 
security is dependent on our success. Our task is a formidable 
one, but our future is infinitely bright. (01.01.1955) 
(2) ᡁف䘭ᘥ഻⡦൘ഋॱഋᒤԕࡽ么ሾ䶙ભݸ⛸ˈᬢ九亡ˈ⍱凞
㹰ˈ᧘㘫ҶйॳᒤֶሸࡦⲴ᭯億ˈ㐐䙐Ҷӎ⍢ㅜаػй≁ѫ㗙Ⲵ
≁ѫ഻ᇦˈ䙉ᱟᡁفѝ㨟≁഻ᴰݹ῞Ⲵ↧ਢˈӖᱟᡁفޘ഻䓽≁
ᴰٹབྷⲴ㌰ᘥᰕᆀǄ We (should) come to think about our na-
tional father, who led the martyrs to sacrifice their lives and shed 
their blood, and in the end succeeded in overthrowing the despot-
ic political body that lasted for 3,000 years, and established the 
first democratic country of the people, by the people, and for the 
people in Asia. This is the most glorious part of the history of the 
Republic of China and the greatest day to remember for us – army 
and citizens alike – in the entire country. (10.10.1955)  
(3) ӺཙབྷᇦⲴ䋜ԫˈቡᱟ㾱䀓ᮁབྷ䲨ޘ億਼㜎Ⲵ㤖䴓ˈ>Ă@ᡁ
فѳ൘ӎ⍢俆ݸᔪ・Ҷㅜаػ≁ѫ㠚⭡഻ᇦˈ᨝䮻Ҷ㩜иݹ㣂Ⲵ
ӎ⍢≁ѫ㠚⭡Ⲵ↧ਢᒿᒅʽ The responsibility of everyone today 
is to relieve the suffering of all compatriots on the mainland […]. 
The country has unveiled the historical prelude to democracy and 
freedom in Asia, which is full of glory! (10.10.1961) 
In addition, legitimation is achieved by referring to a “sense of emer-
gency,” and presenting the KMT government – which calls for the 
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fight against the common enemy – as existing in a “state of excep-
tion” (Agamben 2005). Hereby total war against the CCP can be legit-
imised. This is a typical discursive strategy for militarising the country 
(for CKS’s other strategies, see Cheng in this topical issue).  
Example (4) is an expression of such a sense of emergency, 
which is achieved through the exhortation to citizens not to let go of 
the timely opportunity for revolution. It finds expression in the com-
bination of negative modality, instantiated by the phrase ⊪н㜭 (jue 
buneng) “must not,” and the semantic description of time as 〽㑡ণ䙍 
(shaozongjishi) “an opportunity that will disappear immediately if let go 
of.” Through this linguistic construction, the natural conclusion of 
taking immediate action (instantiated by the phrase ࣐㏺  (jiajin) 
“stepping up preparations for a counterattack”) can be arrived at. The 
same applies to the combination of the adverb ᗎ䙏 (congsu) “speed 
up” and the action verb 䎧ֶ (qilai) “rise” in example (5), which – 
following this line of thinking – exemplifies CKS urging the country 
to cooperate and to take action as soon as possible. Example (6) illus-
trates how the message of urgency is clad in a restrictive conditional 
ਚᴹᡁفĂ᡽㜭 (zhi you women… cai neng) “only in this way can we,” 
which eliminates any alternative plan of action. 
(4) նᱟӺᰕ⎧ޗཆ਼㜎៹䂢࠷ሖ⸕䚃˖ᡁف⇿аػӪˈ䜭ᴹ᧕៹
䙉а৽ޡᣇ᳤Ⲵ䋜ԫˈᡁف⊪н㜭᭮䙾䙉аᱲ₏˗ᗎӺཙ䎧ˈᡁ
فᴤ៹⹕⽚⿞㗙ᓹᚕⲴ≁᯿≓ㇰˈⲬᨊᆍᚼᘐؑⲴപᴹᗧᙗˈ࣐
㏺৽᭫བྷ䲨Ⓠۉˈ৺ᱲ᭟ᨤབྷ䲨਼㜎䙉䶙ભ兕⡝Ⲵሖ䳋㹼अˈֶ
䗾᧕䙉〽㑡ণ䙍Ⲵ䶙ભ₏䙻ǄBut now, all compatriots in this 
country and overseas should really keep in mind that each and all 
of us share the responsibility for fighting communism and despot-
ism, so we must not give up this great opportunity; from this day 
on, we should all the more sharpen our national trait and cherish 
our traditional ethics, so we may step up preparations for a coun-
terattack at full speed and reach out a helping hand to our com-
patriots on the mainland, so that we may welcome the fleeting 
window of opportunity for revolution. (01.01.1956) 
(5) བྷᇦ៹䂢ᗎ䙏䎧ֶˈ൘䶂ཙⲭᰕ⦘・㠚⭡Ⲵབྷᰇѻлˈޡ਼а
㠤ˈֶ㒬᢯ᡁف഻⡦ᆛѝኡݸ⭏Ⲵᔪ഻䚪ᘇˈⲬᨊᡁفݸ⛸⛪഻
ᇦ㠷Ӫ≁㘼⦫䓛Ⲵᮁ഻㋮⾎ˈ⎸⓵ޡग़ˈᢃق״ᇷˈᚒᗙѝ㨟≁
഻⦘・ᒣㅹ㠷㠚⭡ˈ䟽ᔪ≁ᴹ≁⋫≁ӛⲴй≁ѫ㗙ᯠѝ഻Ǆ
Everybody should get up as soon as we can, and, under the beau-
tiful flag of the Republic of China (that has the blue sky and the 
white sun on it), together we inherit the will of our national father, 
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Dr. Sun Yat-sen, in order to proclaim the gist of saving the coun-
try, for which our forerunners died, wipe out the communist ban-
dits, and destroy the Russian thieves, so that we may restore the 
independence, equality and freedom of the Republic of China and 
may reconstruct a new China of the people, by the people, and for 
the people. (10.10.1956) 
(6) ҏਚᴹᡁفᣡᇊ䮧ᵏྞ兕Ⲵ⊪ᗳˈ᡽㜭㎀ਸਠ⎧ᡠ⡝㠷བྷ䲨䶙
ભˈᡀ⛪аػ৽᭫ᗙ഻Ⲵᮤػ࣋䟿ǄOnly if we hold our determi-
nation to fight for a long time can we combine the Taiwan Strait 
war with the mainland revolution to become a total force for 
counterattack and resumption of the country. (10.10.1958)  
In the data examined, another legitimising strategy worth mentioning 
is the recurrent idolisation of the dead. This is done to justify CKS’s 
demands that people dedicate their lives, in terms of comforting the 
souls in heaven. This mechanism will be discussed in the section 
below on dissimulation by metaphorical conceptualisation.  
Myth-Making Strategies 
In the data, another discursive strategy of CKS for creating social 
reality is the practice of reification (e.g. naturalisation) as well as the 
invention of imaginary compatriots in China waiting to be “rescued 
from the communist yoke.” Naturalisation is achieved, for example, 
by the use of presuppositions and the adoption of an assertive style. 
This is realised through declaratives and/or the absence of modal 
verbs and adverbs. Examples (7) and (8) illustrate the declarative 
mode of diction, eliminating alternative versions of reality. Example 
(9) shows how myth arises by presupposing that mainland compat-
riots expect to be rescued. In example (10), the propositions about 
“pilferage” and “madness and intensified atrocities” are presented as 
unquestioned truths. 
(7) ਼㜎فʽᡁف䓽һ৽᭫Ⲵ㹼अˈਚᴹйػ>Ă@Ǆ“Dear com-
patriots! There are only three types of military counteraction.” 
(10.10.1955) 
(8)Ӻᰕབྷ䲨кਇ䴓Ⲵ਼㜎ᐢ㏃н㜭޽ᗽਇަ ᙆ઼༃ᩮˈਚᴹ㠚
अⲴ䎧ֶ৽ᣇˈ↫ѝ≲⭏ҶǄޡग़⛪Ҷ䧞༃≁⵮Ⲵ৽ᣇˈҏਚᴹ
࣐㏺Ⲵ䘛ᇣ઼᪗⇈Ǆ᭵བྷ䲨кˈᣇ᳤㠷⇈ᇣᐢᡀ⛪ᛢឈⲴᗚ⫠ˈ
㠚ᗵ䟰ᡀޘ億≁⵮Ⲵབྷ䶙ભǄ൘䙉ѝ䯃ˈޡग़㠚❦㘼❦ᴳ䎠кҶ
Ԇፙ■Ⲵ㎅䐟ˈ㘼фⴞࡽҏ↓൘࣐䙏Ⲵ䎠к䙉ፙ■Ⲵ㎅䐟Ǆ
Today, our compatriots who suffer in the mainland can no longer 
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endure the tyranny and exploitation (by the Communist Party), 
and the only way out for them is to rise up (against communist 
rule). The only thing that the communist bandits can do is to scale 
up the oppression and devastation more than ever. Therefore, on 
the mainland, anti-tyranny and oppression together have become a 
miserable circle, which will in the end lead to a great revolution by 
all people. Meanwhile, the communist bandits will naturally reach 
a dead-end and collapse, which is now on its way and the end will 
soon come in no time. (10.10.1955) 
(9) ᴤᜏᴹ䙉⁓ˈ᡽㜭н䋐ᡁف൘≤␡⚛⟡ѝˈᧉ᡾㤖兕Ⲵབྷ䲨਼
㜎䘛࠷Ⲵᵏᖵʽ“Only this way can we live up to the eager expec-
tations of the mainland compatriots, who are struggling hard to be 
rescued!” (10.10.1957) 
(10) 㠚ྨग़ヺᬊབྷ䲨ޛᒤԕֶˈަ௚ᗳ⯵⣲ˈ᜸╄᜸⛸Ⲵ᳤㹼ˈ
ऒሷ䘛֯ᡁ഻ᇦ≁᯿≨␚⎙ࣛǄGiven [the evil bandits’] pilferage 
of the mainland in the past eight years, their madness and intensi-
fied atrocities are bound to compel the nation to perpetuate its ca-
tastrophe. (10.10.1957) 
Strategy of Categorising Groups into Opposite Polarities 
Categorising people in an essentialist and antagonist way creates po-
larities of in- and out-groups, with positive Self and negative Other 
representations. The Self is glorified as the first democratic country in 
Asia, thereby constructing a rhetorical contrast between the demo-
cratic foundation of the Self and the non-democratic Other – namely, 
the autocratic imperial Qing rule or the communist rule of the Chi-
nese Communist Party (CCP)/Russia. While the Self as well as the 
need for citizens’ sacrifice are glorified, a common enemy is con-
structed. In combination with the naturalisation strategy, this antago-
nist practice can be very powerful in discursively constructing politi-
cal reality and influencing popular opinion. While previous excerpts 
already comprise examples of how the communist Other is demon-
ised, example (11) includes the illustrious phrase ޡग़ (gongfei) “com-
munist bandits” while (12) makes a reference to the CCP as a “pup-
pet regime”㸦ڰݑ, kuilei): 
(11) ਼㜎فʽᡁف䜭⸕䚃ޡग़ᵡ∋䶙ભⲴᾥ℺᳤᭯ˈн۵ᱟੋѫ
ሸࡦⲴ⍱∂ˈ㘼фԆف൘㰷״ᑍ഻ѫ㗙᫽㑡ѻлˈᆼޘሷᡁفӪ
≁Ⲵ⭏ભ઼㠚⭡ˈ഻ᇦⲴ么൏઼ѫ℺ཹ⦫ᯬ״ᑍˈԕ䙎ަ䌓഻⓵
ぞⲴⰻ⣲⦨ᙗǄDear compatriots! We all know that the utter tyr-
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anny of the communist bandits Zhu and Mao is a poisonous rem-
nant of the aristocratic despotism; moreover, under the control of 
Soviet imperialism, they have sacrificed everything to it – every-
thing including our people’s lives and freedom, our land and sov-
ereignty, so that they may have their own crazy way as traitors like 
animals. (01.01.1957) 
In the data, frequent instantiations can be found of such a rhetorical 
strategy, with relatively negative appraisals of the CCP, its leaders, 
and of Russia. Example (12) is a typical instance, where the leaders of 
the CCP – Zhu and Mao – are compared to puppets ڰݑ controlled 
by the Russian Communist Party. 
(12) Ăᡁف᭯ᓌф൘ᵜ഻么൏ѻкˈ么ሾޘ਼഻㜎ˈ㠷↔״ޡڰ
ݑⲴ╒ྨᵡ∋ˈ↓൘޽᧕޽ৢⲴ֌ีᗽⲴᨿ兕ǄOn the territory 
of our country, our government has also led the entire nation, in 
perseverance, in fighting against Zhu and Mao’s puppet regime 
(controlled by) the Russian communists. (10.10.1956) 
Strategy of Unification 
Bringing citizens together under the banner of “commonality” serves 
to infuse a national spirit of unity. The speeches are replete with deic-
tic markers, such as the inclusive “us,” “our,” “compatriots,” or refer-
ences made to “the whole country,” “everyone.” This marks off com-
patriots and those with similar anti-communist values from others. 
Additionally, the many nationalist references to “people” (“people-
centred,” “people-dominated,” “people-to-people”), echo the political 
philosophy of the “Three Principles of the People” – as propagated by 
Sun Yat-sen, founder of the ROC and the very person who is repeat-
edly called the father of the nation. Example (13) demonstrates the 
cumulative force of the unifying linguistic devices.  
(13) ᡁفѝ㨟≁᯿⛪Ҷᮁ㠚ᐡˈ⛪Ҷᮁӎ⍢ˈ⛪Ҷᮁц⭼Ӫ于ˈ
ᗵ丸❑࠶ൠ॰ˈ❑࠶ぞ᯿ˈ❑࠶㚧ᾝˈ❑࠶ᇇᮉؑԠ઼а࠷䲾
㍊ˈ䜭៹䂢лᇊ⊪ᗳˈㄉ൘ᮁ഻ᇦ㠷ᮁ≁᯿ԕ㠚ᮁⲴ䶂ཙⲭᰕᰇ
ᒏѻлˈൈ㎀䎧ֶˈޡ਼а㠤ˈֶ⎸⓵↔❑ᚕ╒ྨ㩜ᜑޡग़ˈㄝ
ⴑᡁف䙉аԓᮁ഻ᮁ≁Ⲵ㚧䋜Ǆᡁف⴨ؑˈࠑᡁ਼㜎൘৽䌓഻ǃ
৽ྤᖩǃ৽␵㇇઼৽ᾥ℺Ⲵ৽ޡ兕⡝ѻѝˈ❑䄆൘഻ޗᡆ഻ཆĂ
In order to save ourselves, to save the entirety of Asia, and to save 
humankindin theworld,we, the Chinese people, regardless of area, 
race, occupation, religion, and class, all must be determined and
stand together under the national flag of the blue sky and the 
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white sun, symbolic of saving the country and the nation to save 
oneself, in order to annihilate the shameless Han-betrayers and the 
most evil communist bandits and to fulfil the responsibility of sav-
ing the country and the people on our shoulders.We believe that 
all our compatriots, in the anti-communist war against slavery and 
totalitarianism, no matter where you are […]. (01.01.1956) 
Example (14) similarly refers to Sun Yat-sen as “our father,” and to 
“our common mission” to expel the Russian thieves, eliminate 
Zhu/Mao (bandits), revitalise the mainland, rescue our compatriots, 
and to rebuild the ROC as a modern nation. 
(14) ѝ↓予㠷ᡁޘ഻䓽≁਼㜎ˈ൘ᡁف഻⡦么ሾ䶙ભǃ㢡䴓㐐䙐
ѝ㨟≁഻Ⲵ䮻഻㌰ᘥᰕˈӂ⴨ㆆࣹˈޡ਼ྞ兕ˈֶᆼᡀᡁف偵䲔
״ᇷˈ⎸⓵ᵡ∋ˈݹᗙབྷ䲨ˈ䀓ᮁ਼㜎ˈ䟽ᔪѝ㨟≁഻⛪ǋ≁
ᴹǃ≁⋫ǃ≁ӛǌй≁ѫ㗙⨮ԓ഻ᇦⲴޡ਼֯ભǄChung-cheng 
[CKS] is dedicated to working together with the military and civil-
ian compatriots of our entire nation, on the anniversary of the 
revolutionary founding of our country by our father, who created 
the ROC. It is our common mission to expel the Russian thieves, 
eliminate Zhu/Mao (bandits), revitalise the mainland, rescue our 
compatriots, and to rebuild the ROC as a modern nation, by, for, 
and with the people – with the Three Principles of the People as 
our contemporary country’s guiding principle. (01.01.1956)   
Strategy of Dissimulation by Metaphorical Conceptualisation 
Constructing social or political reality through the use of metaphors is 
instrumental in establishing domination by deflecting attention from 
existing relations. In every speech analysed, there is ample evidence 
of figurative language – such as the metaphor of the communist ban-
dits and the family one referring to our national father or the “father-
land.” The examples presented earlier clearly illustrate this practice.  
A striking conceptualisation, one worthy of elaboration, is the 
description of the ancestors, slain in war, as martyrs. Idolising the 
dead appears, as noted, to be a frequent persuasive strategy in CKS’s 
wartime discourse. In example (15), CKS urges the entire nation to 
inherit the national father’s last will㸦㒬᢯഻⡦Ⲵ䚪ᘇ, jicheng guofu de 
yizhi㸧and to march together following the trail of blood of the mar-
tyrs (䐿㪇ݸ⛸Ⲵ㹰䐑, tazhe xianlie de xieji. It is conceptually interest-
ing to dig deeper into the latter phrase, as a “trail of blood” (㹰䐑, 
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xieji) is a clear metonymic reference to the existence of former battles, 
thus being based on a war metaphor.  
In addition to the war metaphor, one of a journey is also present 
in the language used. For example, when the nation is said to march, 
it marches “following” (䐿㪇, tazhe) “the trail left behind by the pas-
sage of the predecessors.” Passages like those in example (15) have a 
persuasive function similar to that of the aforementioned building 
metaphor, where the martyrs and the national father are metaphori-
cally compared to construction workers who “laid the foundations” 
of the country. Hence, they are an important target of national wor-
ship. The collaboration of war metaphor and journey metaphor in 
excerpts like example (15) similarly highlights the sacrifice made by 
the martyrs (via a linguistic elaboration of the concept of “blood”), 
and achieves the goal of persuasively elevating the status of the mar-
tyrs – and thus making them a target of nationwide worship. Example 
(16) is a natural consequence of such persuasive rhetoric, as when 
one sheds blood and dies for the country, the individual is to be re-
membered by the people who enjoy peace and prosperity as a result 
of this nation-building achievement. Such a rhetorical device can also 
have a cultural function, as it is equally based on the typical Chinese 
understanding of death as a return journey to heaven (Lu 2017). 
(15) ᜏᴹࣚ࣋㒬᢯഻⡦Ⲵ䚪ᘇˈ䐿㪇ݸ⛸Ⲵ㹰䐑ˈԕีᗽнᤄⲴ
⊪ᗳˈ਼ӷᮥᝮⲴ㹼अǄThe only thing we should do is to strive 
to inherit our national father’s will, marching in the trail of the 
martyrs’ blood, work with perseverance and determination, and 
act together against the enemy. (10.10.1957) 
(16) ԕ੺ហ഻⡦઼䄨ݸ⛸൘ཙѻ䵸ʽ“so that we may comfort 
the souls of our national father and our martyrs in heaven.” 
(10.10.1960) 
It is worth mentioning that there is a rhetorical pattern in CKS’s 
speeches, which is evident in the fact that the phrase ഻⡦઼䄨ݸ⛸൘
ཙѻ䵸 (guofu han zhu xianlie zaitianzhiling, “the souls of our national 
father and our martyrs in heaven”) occurs in 14 out of CKS’s total of 
41 speeches given throughout his presidency (from 1955 to 1976). 
Among the 15 occurrences (featuring twice in the New Year’s Day 
speech of 1963), 12 are right in the penultimate part of the speech 
each time – immediately followed by such typical closing cheers as ѝ
㨟≁഻㩜↢ʽ(zhonghuaminguo wansui) “Long live ROC!” й≁ѫ㗙㩜
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↢ʽ(sanminzhuyi wansui) and “Long live the Three Principles of the 
People!” among a handful of others. 
5KHWRULFDO3DWWHUQV
In addition to the above-mentioned symbolic strategies that reveal 
the hegemonic and naturalising tendencies of authoritarian discourse, 
the following characteristics of nationalist language style strengthen 
the authoritative character of these speeches. 
Exhortations
Exhortative speech acts, such as “we must” or “we should,” have the 
illocutionary force of mobilising the people into making sacrifices for 
the common good. They serve to rally the people around the national 
father figure, with the strengthening tactic of adducing a spiritual 
dimension too (“in the heavenly spirit of the founding father Sun 
Yat-sen”). The religious aspect re-emerges in multiple references 
made to the martyrs, whose “spirit” is also “in heaven.”  Example 
(17) illustrates the mood of urgency, while example (18) also uncov-
ers the strategic combination of spiritual and metaphorical language 
(the father, the martyrs, or the journey) to generate a more forceful 
propagandistic message.
(17) བྷᇦ៹䂢ᗎ䙏䎧ֶ  “Everyone should get up quickly.” 
(10.10.1956) 
(18) ਼㜎فʽᡁف⭏⮦Ӫ于ભ䙻⊪ᇊⲴ䰌九ˈ৸ሽ㠚ᐡ഻ᇦ≁᯿
Ⲵ↧ਢ䋐ᴹ㒬ᖰ䮻ֶⲴ䋜ԫˈ⮦↔䴉ॱ഻ឦԔㇰˈᜏᴹൈ㎀а㠤
ˈ㒬᢯഻⡦Ⲵ䚪ᘇˈ䘭䳘ݸ⛸Ⲵ㹰䐑ˈ਼ᗳаᗧˈ࡫㤖ྞ兕ˈ⎸
⓵ޡग़ˈݹᗙ⋣ኡˈ᡽н䗌䋐Ӻཙ㌰ᘥ഻ឦⲴ䟽བྷ᜿㗙ˈҏ᡽ਟ
ԕ੺ហ഻⡦઼䶙ભݸ⛸൘ཙѻ䵸ǄCompatriots! We were born at 
the most decisive juncture of the fate of humankind, and we are 
responsible for the nation’s history and its future. When we cele-
brate this glorious Double Ten National Day, we must unite and 
inherit the legacy of the father, follow the blood of the martyrs, 
and work hard together. The elimination of the communists and 
the restoration of the rivers and mountains will not fail to com-
memorate the great significance of the National Day today, and it 
will also be possible to comfort the national father’s and the revo-
lutionary martyrs’ spirit in heaven. (10.10.1959) 
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Emotions, Virtues, and Moral Values  
Emotive language and moral argumentation are, in addition, used to 
implant in the minds of the people of Taiwan the moral need to sal-
vage the Chinese nation from communist ideology, as spread by the 
CCP and stemming from Russian Leninist-Marxist thinking. As evi-
dent in examples (19) and (20), the speeches exhibit an abundance of 
emotional appeals to the virtues of perseverance. Additionally, at-
tempts are made to inculcate a sense of responsibility and urgency by 
referring to necessity and adding restrictive conditionals. Emotion is 
further generated by the multiple references made to “martyrs’ blood 
and sacrifice.”  
(19) 㤕൘ᱲ₏ᵚࡠѻࡽˈᗵ丸ีᇊ⊹㪇ˈᗽਇа࠷Ⰻ㤖ˈⓆۉᵚ
ֶⲴ㹼अǄྲ᷌ᱲ₏аࡠˈቡ㾱ᴹ⊪ᗳǃᴹࣷ≓ˈн亗а࠷⣗
⢢ˈีᤱ֌ᡠࡠᓅǄBefore the right time comes, you must perse-
vere and bear all sufferings, thereby prepare yourselves for future 
actions. If the right time comes, you must be determined, coura-
geous, and fight till the end, regardless of what sacrifice to make. 
(01.01.1957) 
(20) ӺཙབྷᇦⲴ䋜ԫˈቡᱟ㾱䀓ᮁབྷ䲨ޘ億਼㜎Ⲵ㤖䴓Ǆ“The 
responsibility of everyone today is to relieve the suffering of all 
the compatriots on the mainland.” (01.01.1961) 
Megalomaniac Expressions 
In addition to this emotion-laden language, positive descriptors of 
appraisal – such as the adjectives “great,” “glorious,” and their super-
latives, as exemplified in example (21) – construct an exhilarating 
spirit. Not unusual in leaders’ National Day speeches, this creates a 
semantic field of glory and excitement.  
(21) 䙉ᱟᡁفѝ㨟≁഻ᴰݹ῞Ⲵ↧ਢˈӖᱟᡁفޘ഻䓽≁ᴰٹབྷ
Ⲵ㌰ᘥᰕᆀǄ“This is the most glorious history of us the Republic 
of China and the greatest memorial day of us as a nation.” 
(10.10.1955) 
Repetition and Parallelism 
To reinforce all previously mentioned strategies, the rhetorical force 
of repetition and parallelism further instils the sense of urgency and 
necessity, and help legitimise war as the only way to rescue the Chi-
nese nation. In addition, the assertive mode triggered by the modal 
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adverb ᶨ⭂ (yiding) “surely” leaves no room for alternative visions of 
the future. Examples (22) and (23) illustrate the repeated assertiveness 
of prediction, and the construction of a sense of urgency through the 
restrictive conditional phrase “only in this way can we” – being each 
time reinforced by stylistic parallelism.  
(22) ਼㜎فʽӪ于↧ਢᰙᐢ੺䁤ᡁف˖ᝋ഻Ⲵ࣋䟿ᴰᖼаᇊᡠऍ
䌓഻Ⲵ࣋䟿˗ӪᙗⲴ࣋䟿ᴰᖼаᇊᡠऍ⦨ᙗⲴ࣋䟿˗≁ѫ㠚⭡Ⲵ
࣋䟿ᴰᖼаᇊᡠऍᾥ℺ྤᖩⲴ࣋䟿ǄCompatriots! Human history 
has already told us: the power of patriotism surely overcomes that 
of betrayal; the power of humanity surely overcomes that of bru-
tality; the power of freedom and democracy surely overcomes that 
of tyranny and slavery. (10.10.1956) 
(23) ⨮൘ᡁف䶒㠘഻ᇦ≁᯿Ⲵオࡽ⎙ࣛˈᜏᴹࣚ࣋㒬᢯഻⡦Ⲵ䚪
ᘇˈ䐿㪇ݸ⛸Ⲵ㹰䐑ˈԕีᗽнᤄⲴ⊪ᗳˈ਼ӷᮥᝮⲴ㹼अˈぽ
ᾥ᭟ᨤབྷ䲨਼㜎৽ޡᣇ᳤Ⲵ䶙ભ䙻अˈ⎸⓵ޡग़ˈ偵䲔״ᇷˈݹ
ᗙ⋣ኡˈሖ⨮й≁ѫ㗙ˈᆼᡀ഻≁䶙ભǄҏᜏᴹ䙉⁓ˈᡁف᡽㜭
੺ហ഻⡦઼ݸ⛸ԕ৺ॳⲮ㩜৽ޡᣇ᳤ѝ↫䴓਼㜎൘ཙѻ䵸˗ᴤᜏ
ᴹ䙉⁓ˈ᡽㜭н䋐ᡁف൘≤␡⚛⟡ѝˈᧉ᡾㤖兕Ⲵབྷ䲨਼㜎䘛࠷
ⲴᵏᖵʽNow we are faced with an unprecedented catastrophe of 
the country and the nation, so we must strive to inherit the na-
tional father’s legacy, marching in the blood of the martyrs, work 
in perseverance and determination, and must actively support the 
anti-communist and anti-tyranny revolutionary initiatives by our 
compatriots on the mainland, so we may annihilate the communist 
bandits, drive out the Soviet marauders, restore our land, realise 
the Three Principles, and complete the national revolution. Only 
in this way can we comfort the souls in heaven of our national fa-
ther and the martyrs, and of the millions of our compatriots who 
died in anti-communist and anti-tyranny efforts; moreover, only in 
this way can we fulfil the keen expectations of our mainland com-
patriots in dire straits! (10.10.1957) 
&RQFOXVLRQ
The critical discourse analysis of a selection of CKS’s public speeches 
has identified a number of discursive strategies cumulatively pointing 
to an authoritarian and hegemonic style of leadership. It is one that 
eliminates alternative voices, and justifies its demands for sacrifice in 
well-designed, nationalistic forms of propaganda. The rhetoric of 
exhortative speech acts, megalomaniac expressions, repetition and 
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parallelism, metaphorical conceptualisation, emotional language use, 
and moral appeals to virtues and responsibility all come together to 
create a sense of urgency and necessity, thus legitimising a securitisa-
tion narrative of imminent danger if the leader’s commands are not 
heeded. The level of semantic loading and the strong assertive speech 
style emphasise the dramatic nature of the perceived precarious situa-
tion. Through the use of presupposition, assertive declarations, and 
the invention of imaginary “compatriots in China, waiting to be res-
cued from the communist yoke,” the contingency of political reality is 
fixed or naturalised into one hegemonic narrative, closed to alterna-
tive readings.  
Charged with moral and ideological significance, CKS’s leader-
ship rhetoric invariably draws a positive picture of the Self and a con-
demnatory image of the Other. Underlying the speeches are discur-
sive processes of categorising in- and out-groups, where positive 
attributes of the Self are contrasted with negative properties predicat-
ed of the Other. The positive self-representation of the benevolent 
KMT leader, CKS, flattering depictions of Sun Yat-sen, the founding 
father of the Republic of China, and negative characterisations of the 
communist Chinese/Russian Other as well as the imperialist Other in 
the pre-Republican era all lay bare essentialist and polarising categori-
sation strategies. KMT, its leaders, and the martyrs who sacrificed 
their lives are given overwhelming praise for creating the first demo-
cratic nation in Asia, while the communist bandits are demonised for 
endangering China, the rest of Asia, and ultimately world peace. Meta-
phorical language use serves the purpose of dissimulation, in that it 
ideologically induces a mixed construal of the country’s development 
as a journey and as a war. This justifies the proposed military course 
of action in such a way as to deflect attention from existing relations, 
while also engaging in the essentialist categorisation of the forces of 
good and evil. CKS’s early wartime public speeches are full of meta-
phors and other tropes as legitimising strategies, being typical of au-
thoritarian leadership discourse. 
Besides the practice of dissimulation, other symbolic strategies 
include unification and legitimation. As for the first, individualities are 
embraced in a collective identity, irrespective of their political or cul-
tural differences. A national spirit of commonality or unity is reached 
through repetitive use of the inclusive “we,” thus galvanising patriotic 
fervour and inspiring Taiwanese citizens to follow in the footsteps of 
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the ROC’s national father and the martyrs who died for the Chinese 
nation. Legitimation is achieved in a variety of ways, as has been illus-
trated in this article. Multiple references to the historicity as well as 
urgency of the mission create a securitisation narrative, legitimising 
the call for future military action. Similarly, the idolisation of the dead 
justifies CKS’s demands to sacrifice one’s life in order to comfort 
these martyrs’ souls in heaven. 
To conclude, the importance of the present study is at least two-
fold. First, it adds further empirical evidence to one of the core theo-
retical tenets within CDA that language and power are intertwined. 
This it does by identifying and discussing discursive strategies in hith-
erto unexplored political speeches in a particular Chinese context, 
namely the public addresses by the leader of the KMT, Chiang Kai-
shek. Often called “Generalissimo,” CKS is a textbook example of a 
Chinese authority figure employing language for strategic and persua-
sive purposes. The use of his public speeches allows one to identify 
hegemonic traits within authoritarian leadership discourse, along with 
other rhetorical strategies typical of authoritarian political leaders.  
Second, the study adds empirical discourse research to the fields 
of Chinese and Asian Studies regarding its use of a representative and 
authoritative speech sample by CKS – something which has hitherto 
been lacking to the best of our knowledge. By incorporating the ana-
lytical frameworks from CDA/CMA, the study provides a close-up 
shot of the anatomy of CKS’s political and military struggle against 
communist China by focusing on the linguistic and rhetorical aspects 
of his governance. The present study, in addition, echoes Cheng’s 
(this issue) analysis of the necropolitical nature of the KMT regime, 
delineating how the national Self and the communist Other are lin-
guistically demarcated in CKS’s speeches and how Taiwanese citizens 
in that era were thus mobilised to sacrifice their lives and to act in 
unity for his ideological struggle. It is hoped that this particular case 
study has demonstrated how language plays a significant role in the 
rule of authoritarian regimes, especially in their formative stages. Given 
the global (re)turn to authoritarianism in countries such as China, 
Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Venezuela, the analysis of language use 
by an authoritarian regime of the past is highly relevant for studies of 
contemporary political life and governance too. 
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